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ABSTRACT
It is generally very difficult to measure the effects of a currency depreciation on a country’s balance
sheet and financing costs given the endogenous properties of the exchange rate. History provides at
least one natural experiment to test whether an exogenous exchange rate depreciation can be
contractionary (via an increased real debt burden) or expansionary (via an improved current account).
France’s decision to suspend the free coinage of silver in 1876 played a paramount role in causing
a large exogenous depreciation of the nominal exchange rates of all silver standard countries versus
gold-backed currencies such as the British pound—the currency in which much of their debt was
payable. Our identifying assumption is that France’s decision to end bimetallism was exogenous
from the viewpoint of countries on the silver standard. To deal with heterogeneity we implement a
difference in differences estimator. Sovereign yield spreads for countries on the silver standard
increased in proportion to the potential currency mismatch. Yield spreads for silver countries
increased ten to fifteen percent in the wake of the depreciation. Basic growth models suggest that
the accompanying reduction in investment could have decreased output per capita by between one
and four percent relative to the pre-shock trajectory. This also illustrates that a substantial proportion
of the decrease in spreads gold standard countries identified in the “Good Housekeeping” literature
could be attributable to the increase in exchange rate stability. Finally, if emerging markets are going
to embrace international capital flows, the most export oriented countries will manage to mitigate
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I. Introduction 
 
A currency mismatch occurs when a country’s debt is denominated in a foreign 
currency while its revenue streams are largely in local currency. Currency mismatches make a 
country vulnerable. A sudden real exchange rate depreciation can abruptly reduce the ability 
to repay foreign currency debt. On the other hand, exchange rate depreciation could also 
stimulate exports and reduce default risk by improving a country’s ability to pay. If debt 
valuation effects dominate, this deterioration of a country’s “balance sheet” could increase 
default risk.
1   
Currency mismatches are in fact ubiquitous, and they are deemed by many to create 
financial fragility by accelerating the onset of a financial crisis or exacerbating the severity of 
financial crises. Balance sheet problems are at the heart of many explanations for the severity 
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and have been analyzed in new micro-founded open-
economy models such as that found in Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004). However, few, 
if any, papers have been able to empirically assess the precise links among currency 
depreciation, a country’s balance sheet, and financing costs given the endogeneity  of the 
exchange rate.
2  
Fortunately, history provides a natural experiment to test whether the effects of an 
exogenous exchange rate depreciation via an interest rate channel can be contractionary or 
expansionary.
3 We focus on the accelerated depreciation of silver in early 1876 which was 
                                                            
1 The literature on balance sheets in international finance builds off Bernanke and Gertler (1989) who 
analyzed collateral constraints, net worth and balance sheets in imperfect domestic capital markets and 
their role in accentuating economic fluctuations. 
2 There are quite a number of theoretical and empirical studies on the origins of original sin or the 
reason why countries seem to issue most international debt in hard currency. Flandreau and Sussman 
(2004) and Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003), for example, argue that liquidity is an 
important factor in explaining the existence of original sin. Bordo, Meissner, and Redish (2004) find 
that sound financial institutions, monetary regimes, and financial development are not sufficient 
conditions for a country to borrow in its own currency. They argue that large shocks such as the Great 
Depression, wars, and the emergence of a liquid global capital market in the second half of the 
nineteenth century were important factors in explaining how the United States and former British 
colonies overcame original sin. Eichengreen and Hausmann (2002) have also offered some solutions to 
the currency mismatch problem.  
3 In Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) the effect can go either way.  3  
connected to the anticipation of France’s August 1876 decision to suspend the coinage of 
silver which itself guaranteed silver would continue to depreciate against gold.  
France’s move in August 1876 accelerated the trend depreciation of silver already 
underway since 1873. As shown in Figure 1, this decreased demand for silver (and increased 
demand for gold) led to an historically abrupt depreciation of silver. We argue that France’s 
decision and the depreciation of silver was exogenous for the countries with silver-based 
monetary systems. The French debate was watched closely by markets throughout early 1876, 
and French suspension of silver coinage became an increasingly sure thing up to August 
1876. Between January 1876 and mid-1876 markets incorporated this information into their 
expectations perceiving the likelihood of an accelerated and sustained silver depreciation to 
be greater and greater with each passing week. These factors, combined with the fact that a 
large portion of countries’ liabilities were denominated and payable in gold currency, suggest 
that the rapid decline of silver in early 1876 provides a unique historical experiment to study 
one of the key predictions of the theoretical literature on currency mismatches.  
We use a new weekly database of sovereign debt prices collected from The 
Economist, and undertake a before and after comparison or event study using a difference in 
differences (DID) regression strategy. This approach eliminates pre-existing differences in 
risk between silver and non-silver countries and controls for market forces affecting all 
countries. We measure the impact of the suspension of silver coinage on sovereign yield 
spreads for countries on a silver standard compared to non-silver countries. We find that 
sovereign spreads for the silver group increased following the expectation of suspension of 
silver coinage by France because their hard currency liabilities increased relative to their 
ability to pay for such liabilities. Our results are consistent with the idea that balance sheet 
management is key to avoiding fragility in a world of currency mismatches. Moreover, the 
implied impact on the real economy of currency instability might also have been substantial. 
The channel would run from increased financing costs to lower equilibrium investment and 
finally to lower output per capita. If a currency risk premium were built in to the cost of  4  
issuing new liabilities used to fund additions to the capital stock, output per capita could have 
been one to four percent lower than if borrowing costs were free of such a penalty. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical 
background and extant empirical evidence. Section III reviews different explanations for the 
French-cum-global demonetization of silver. This is followed by an historical discussion of 
important events in the market for gold and silver in the 1870s to motivate the event study. 
We then introduce the new database on sovereign spreads and analyze the effects of the 
suspension of silver coinage by France on sovereign default risk. Section VI concludes the 
paper with a discussion and the implications of our results for investment and growth.  
 
Section II. Hard Currency Debt, Hard Theory, and a Hard Empirical Problem 
 
Hard currency debt and its attendant problems for emerging market economies have 
generated substantial interest among economists and policymakers since the mid-1990s.
4 The 
severity of the Asian financial crisis and the Tequila crisis in Mexico was partially attributed 
to the damaging effect of large depreciations in the face of preponderant dollarized liabilities. 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) related the problem of original sin to exchange rate 
regime choices and financial stability. Recently, Bordo and Meissner (forthcoming) have 
found evidence that currency mismatches are associated with a higher probability of a debt or 
banking crisis both before 1913 and since 1973. Bleakley and Cowan (2002), on the other 
hand, find that hard currency debt risk may have been hedged away in a sample of Latin 
American firms.  
Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) analyze the impact of an unexpected 
devaluation in a micro-founded open-economy model with nominal rigidities and balance 
sheet effects. Their theoretical analysis suggests that the impact depends on several crucial 
country-characteristics: the total level of indebtedness (relative to net worth), the degree of 
                                                            
4 Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005)  discuss the impact of ‘original sin’ on various 
macroeconomic indicators.  5  
financial friction in an economy, the responsiveness of exports to devaluations and the 
importance of exports in total output.  The authors argue that depreciations are expansionary 
in financially developed economies that carry low-debt burdens and can easily sell goods on 
international markets. For financially vulnerable economies (they use Argentina as an 
example) that do not possess these characteristics, depreciations can be contractionary. In 
vulnerable countries, devaluation raises the cost of capital and increases the debt burden while 
there is little benefit on the export side. We are interested in testing empirically how much a 
surprise depreciation could raise the cost of borrowing. 
There is little systematic empirical research that can shed light on this question.
5 One 
explanation for the small number of convincing studies is that the exchange rate is one of the 
most endogenous variables in an economy. Many studies have shown that the exchange rate 
depends on a variety of macroeconomic fundamentals including the trade balance, relative 
money supplies, and economic output. Other studies point to the importance of news and 
expectations as driving forces in exchange rate movements (Frankel and Rose, 1995).  
In the economic history literature, several recent studies have focused on the importance of 
sound macroeconomic policy for sovereign yield spreads during the classical gold standard 
period. Bordo and Rockoff (1996) argue that maintaining a gold standard was a “Good 
Housekeeping Seal of Approval.” Adherence to the gold standard was a signal to financial 
markets that a country would adopt time-consistent monetary and fiscal policies. For a sample 
of 12 countries, they found that countries on the gold standard had significantly lower bond 
spreads all else equal. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) obtained a similar empirical result using a 
panel data set that included more countries. Sussman and Yafeh (2000) showed that Japan 
experienced a drop in its spread of about 200 basis points immediately after adopting the gold 
standard.  
                                                            
5 Powell and Sturzenegger (2000) is an exception. Using a number of event studies, they find 
that the link between announcements about currency stability and sovereign risk varies from country to 
country. They suggest further investigation of the possibility that country characteristics and policies 
could influence the level of the impact.  
  6  
Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2006) contrast this with the experience of Russia which 
adopted the gold standard in the same year but was given no such reduction. They argue is 
that investors viewed Japan’s policy change as a commitment to “macroeconomic stability” 
while in Russia any such news had already been incorporated following financial reforms in 
the previous years. Overall, this literature chalks up such declines to enhanced policy stability 
and views the gold standard as simply the crown jewel of such a policy program.  
Flandreau and Zúmer (2004), on the other hand, argue that joining the gold standard 
did not lead to a reduction in spreads. While they do assert that depreciation and floating 
might have led markets to perceive incipient payment difficulties in theory, they claim to 
show that sound fiscal discipline and export-orientation play a far greater role than exchange 
rate movements in determining the level of country spreads between 1880 and 1913 in their 
specifications.  
Although these previous studies have provided important insights, historical studies 
have also assumed that the exchange rate is an exogenous variable. We believe that the 
endogeneity of the exchange rate regime or the level of the nominal exchange rate poses an 
important and challenging identification problem that has not adequately been dealt with in 
previous studies. Critics of the “Good Housekeeping” literature suggest that if omitted or 
unobservable factors change around the time that the gold standard was adopted, the size and 
statistical significance of the causal impact of the exchange rate regime itself could be 
seriously biased. Identifying the importance of exchange rate stability and controlling for 
possible feedback effects makes it difficult to discern the impact of exchange rate 
depreciation on the cost of capital for sovereign entities.  
We propose an event study methodology that circumvents almost all of these 
problems. Rather than estimate the impact of a package of macroeconomic policies, we 
provide a clean estimate of the impact of currency depreciation on sovereign risk via its 
impact on the currency mismatch. Specifically, the research design is to observe the spreads 
on a group of comparable long-term sovereign bonds, some of which were denominated in 
silver and some in gold or paper, over the course of a short time span of roughly eleven  7  
months. Restricting attention to a relatively short time span allows us to be certain that 
unobservables did not change over the entire period of interest. We then break this period into 
two periods. The timing of the break point is the point at which market participants begin to 
anticipate and expect a substantial change in the value of silver. We then relate the change in 
bond spreads to the subsequent increase in hard currency debt liabilities relative to exports or 
revenue. By comparing the change in silver countries which faced a uniform and expected 
depreciation in the second period to a control group of “untreated” non-silver countries with 
no expected exchange rate change. We also purge the impact of any shocks that affected the 
entire market. 
 
Section III. The Global Context: France as the Linchpin of the International Monetary 
System 
 
  At the end of the 1860s, the international monetary system was composed of roughly 
four categories of countries. The first group consisted of countries that followed the gold 
standard and included Great Britain, Portugal, Australasia, Canada, and many other members 
of the British Empire. The second group was composed of countries that operated a bimetallic 
system where the mint price of silver was fixed in terms of gold and either metal passed 
current as a means of payment. France and other countries in the Latin Monetary Union were 
the most important members of the bimetallic group. A third group consisted of countries on 
the silver standard, and the final group were those with inconvertible paper money regimes. 
Many silver standard countries were located in Latin America including Mexico, Colombia, 
and Bolivia. India and China were two important members of the silver standard in the Far 
East.   
  By 1880, the makeup of the international monetary system had changed dramatically 
in a span of only ten years. Germany (1871), Holland (1875) and the United States (1879), 
three economically important countries, joined Britain as members of the gold standard. 
France and the rest of the Latin Monetary Union made the decision in 1878 but since France  8  
was a large player it had a choice independent of this general movement. In the end France 
opted for gold and the general move towards gold continued, albeit with some lapses, over the 
next 30 years. On the eve of the First World War, almost every major country in the world 
had adopted the gold standard.
6  We begin with a brief recapitulation of the historical 
literature on these changes. We then offer an explanation based on research by Flandreau as 
to why France’s policies were crucial for silver’s depreciation. Finally we observe that the 
French policy change can conveniently be considered an exogenous nominal exchange rate 
shock for countries outside France. 
There are a number of competing hypotheses that explain the rapid adoption of gold 
in the 1870s.
7 The fundamentalist theory focuses on the world supplies of gold and silver as 
important factors in France’s decision to adopt the gold standard (Kindleberger, 1978).  
Bimetallism was not able to endure the discovery of new silver mines in the American West 
(Comstock Lode in 1859) and new technologies that lowered the cost of extraction. Gallarotti 
(1994) discusses the role of political factors in the emergence of the classical gold standard. 
The industrial revolution helped to enlarge and empower the bourgeoisie class. This group 
supported the adoption of the gold standard because the precious metal was used in large 
transactions and was perceived to be an instrument of stable-money.   
  Kenwood and Lougheed (1979) highlight the role of Germany and international trade 
linkages in the worldwide spread of gold during the 1870s and early 1880s.
 8 Finally, Redish 
(1995) emphasizes the importance of technological advances in the  minting of token coins --
money whose legal tender value exceeded its intrinsic value-- as a key force behind the 
emergence of the gold standard and France’s late adoption of the monetary rule. The 
                                                            
6 China was an exception. The Asian country had a number of local currency systems but many parts of 
China used some form of a silver standard for the entire classical gold standard period. 
7 Flandreau (1996) provides a prologue to the wave of adoption of gold based systems. Flandreau notes 
the role of strategic interaction between France and Germany in setting off the scramble for gold. He 
also suggests network externalities may have been a factor leading to the rise of a global gold standard 
and the demise of silver and bimetallism. Meissner (2005) provides an econometric analysis of the 
competing hypotheses about the diffusion of the gold standard. Network externalities, the level of 
development and the desire to attract low-cost capital appear to be the most important determinants of 
the timing and probability of adoption. 
8 For a discussion of the trade benefits of coordination on the gold standard, see Estevadeordal, Frantz 
and Taylor (2003), Flandreau and Maurel (2001) and López-Córdova and Meissner (2003).  9  
introduction of Boulton and Watt’s steam driven presses allowed countries to easily mint high 
quality (gold) token coins in small denominations.    
Flandreau (1996) disagrees with these views. He notes that the timing of the switch to 
gold in the 1870s is inconsistent with the technological innovations and the discovery of 
silver deposits that occurred years earlier. He also notes that many transactions were settled 
with bills rather than coins. Flandreau argues that since France was a significant player in the 
international market for silver, its policies could single-handedly influence the gold price of 
silver in the open market. This made true bimetallism viable as there was no divergence 
between the mint and market ratios. Nevertheless, France began to limit silver coinage in 
1873 and in 1876 it announced that it would suspend the coinage of silver. By 1878, France 
along with the other members of the Latin Monetary Union had moved to a gold-based 
system.   
  
Section IV. The 1876 French Suspension of Silver Coinage as a Natural Experiment 
 
Flandreau (1996) argues that the worldwide movement towards gold was catalyzed by 
animosities arising from the Franco-Prussian War.
9 The five billion franc indemnity provided 
Germany with the financial capacity to adopt the gold standard.  But France, and the Latin 
Monetary Union along with it, were unwilling to support Germany’s move and found a way 
to stymie the transition by refusing to purchase the large amount of silver Germany needed to 
trade for gold for its transition. France did this by limiting the free coinage of silver from 
1873. Flandreau (1996) also presents a formal model and econometric evidence that France 
was large enough to have “purchased” nearly all of Germany’s silver at the 15.5:1 ratio and 
still had enough gold to maintain de facto bimetallism. Under free coinage of either gold or 
silver, it could have eliminated a divergence between market and mint ratios and would not 
have fallen victim to “Gresham’s law”. Hence Flandreau concludes that France itself was 
                                                            
9 Friedman (1990a, 1990b) argues that the United States’ decision to adopt the gold standard was also a 
historical accident.  10 
responsible for initiating the long-run fall in the value of silver beginning in 1873. When 
France limited silver coinage 1873, silver’s market value declined as supply outstripped 
demand. This also led to increased expectations about the possible abolition of bimetallism 
which in turn fed back onto the market due to speculative activity. 
Evidence from 1873 is convincing on this point. On the day after the 
announcement of limited silver coinage in 1873, silver depreciated against gold 
dramatically and precipitously (see Flandreau, 1996, Figure 5).
10 This “limping 
bimetallism” and the non-committal “wait and see” policy of France continued for 
several years. It became increasingly untenable as the limits on silver coinage 
failed to halt German sales, new silver discoveries came on line, silver’s 
depreciation began to accelerate and political fragmentation increased within 
France on the monetary question. In early 1876, as these pressures mounted and fed 
back on each other, the expectation of a change in French policy helped accelerate 
silver’s depreciation. 
The announcement of plans to discuss a change in policy in France and the 
heightened expectation of a permanent suspension of silver coinage, which we 
demonstrate happened between January 1875 and mid-1876, must have been 
responsible for silver’s accelerated depreciation which began in late January. Since 
1873, The Economist had expected that most European countries would eventually 
abandon silver and bimetallic standards. Our reading of the financial press of the 
time shows that it was obvious to market participants by early 1876 that if France 
abandoned bimetallism, thereby massively decreasing demand for silver, then 
silver’s relative value against gold would keep falling.  
  To assess the market’s view of the French silver question, we collected every major 
news article in The Economist (based in London) and the Economiste Français (based in 
Paris) from July 1, 1875 to August 12, 1876. We chose these outlets as London was the place 
                                                            
10 Even so the official French policy was a “wait and see” policy. There was still a chance that the Bank 
of France would resume free silver purchases at the old mint parity. Informational problems aside, this 
could have also acted to mitigate the expectation that silver’s value in terms of gold was doomed.  11 
of the principal silver market of the time and because the French newspaper could provide an 
insider’s view on political events in France. The Appendix of news articles lists the date and 
provides a summary of each article.  
We first observe that there are few important articles on silver’s depreciation or 
factors affecting silver’s value in 1875 in either magazine. Hence we rule out the idea that 
there was a significant expectation of a large drop in silver’s value in those months. This 
makes it plausible to use most of 1875 as a base period for our before-and-after analysis. 
However, this changes dramatically in January 1876. On January 29, 1876 The Economist 
reported that France might soon suspend free-silver coinage. This represented the first time in 
more than seven months that The Economist printed a significant news story about French 
silver policy. Similarly in the Paris-based magazine, few articles about silver’s fall are evident 
until mid-December, 1875.
12 On January 29, 1876, The Economist reported that the Paris 
Chamber of Commerce asked the French Minister of Commerce and Agriculture to abandon 
silver and adopt the gold standard:    
  .… from the 31
st of January, when the present [Latin] monetary convention 
expires, no more silver five-franc pieces should be coined, that those in circulation 
should be demonetized as soon as circumstances permitted… 
 
This article was followed up by several news stories over the next several months 
that discussed various political and economic aspects of the silver question. The Economist 
reported March 4, 1876 that the Latin Monetary Union had agreed to further limit the issue of 
silver coinage. A week later, the Paris Political Economy Society noted that increased silver 
production from silver mines discovered in the United States several years before, German 
monetary policy, and French silver policy explained the recent drop in the gold value of 
silver.  The article also mentioned that the Bank of France refused to grant loans on the 
security of silver deposits, but The Economist dismissed this last claim as an unfounded 
rumor.  
                                                            
12 Willis (1901) presents a similar timeline of France’s decision to abandon bimetallism.  12 
 The  Economiste Français ran a series of articles up to March emphasizing that 
silver’s fall was unprecedented and analyzed various causes of silver’s fall. On February 5, 
1876, two articles illustrate the expectation of further depreciation. An editorial, one of a 
series of similarly worded formulations, claimed that by the end of 1876 silver would have 
depreciated by fifteen percent. A report from the “principal market for silver” in London 
suggests that short-term expectations are for depreciation. 
  On March 18, 1876, The Economist reported that the Bank of France would continue 
to grant loans collateralized by silver bars and foreign coins, but with a 20 percent reduction 
in the amount per kilogram advanced. The weekly London financial paper also noted that 
silver would continue to depreciate against gold if France decided to abandon bimetallism 
and adopt a gold standard. On March 25, 1876, both The Economist and the Economiste 
Français noted that the French Senate had begun debate on whether the country should 
abandon silver and adopt gold. Leading debaters also discussed a couple of different methods 
by which silver could be demonetized. Leon Say, French Minister of Finance, presented a bill 
that would suspend all silver coinage.  
  The Economist continued to report discussions of the French silver question into 
early April 1876. News articles summarized political debates on whether France should adopt 
gold or retain a bimetallic system.  This was followed by a six week hiatus of new articles on 
the monetary question. In fact this could coincide with a brief triumph for the forces of the 
status quo. An article on April 1, 1876 from the Paris-based weekly suggests that the French 
daily press had been talking of the defeat of the project to abandon bimetallism. The editor’s 
reaction is that the battle may have been lost but the war was not yet over. He goes on to note 
the French government itself seems to see few merits in the old bimetallic system. 
   Discussion of the total suspension of silver coinage resurfaced in mid-June with a 
report that the French Senate would continue its debate over the issue. It was reported in the 
Economiste Français that the commission in charge of the bill in the French senate had 
approved the proposal to suspend silver coinage despite stiff resistance from the ever- 13 
important player The Bank of France. On July 1, 1876, the British financial weekly noted that 
the French Senate discussed a bill that would empower the French government to restrict 
coinage of the silver five-franc piece. Two weeks later, the British government issued a report 
on the depreciation of silver and argued that German demonetization and actions by the Latin 
Monetary Union (led by France) played a key role in the fall in the price of the precious 
metal. By mid-July, confidence in the French newspaper that silver coinage would be 
suspended seems to have become much stronger. The notion that French suspension of 
coinage would lead to further falls in silver is also boldly asserted. 
  The Economist reported on August 5, 1876 that France passed a bill authorizing the 
suspension of free-silver coinage. A week later, the French Minister of Finance issued an 
order that silver bars would not be received at the mints of Paris or Bordeaux for coinage. The 
Economist also noted that the Vice-President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce 
attributed the recent fall in the price of silver to actions by France and the Latin Monetary 
Union. Articles on silver and the monetary question largely die out in the autumn of 1876 in 
Economiste Français. This is further evidence that new information about the fate of silver, 
which was then incorporated into asset prices, was abundant in early 1876 and that little new 
information about silver’s trajectory entered into markets between August and December 
1876. 
  Overall, the evidence from the popular press both in London and Paris, which we 
believe reflects the expectations of silver market participants, strongly suggests that financial 
markets believed there was a high probability France would move to suspend the coinage of 
silver in the months preceding the actual passage of the legislation. Moreover, this translated 
into expectations of depreciation, which via the asset market, turned into actual depreciation. 
Indeed, the sterling price of silver also suggests this interpretation as the gold-backed pound 
appreciated against silver more than ten percent in the first six months of 1876. For this 
reason, this historical episode provides an excellent natural experiment to test the proposition 
that depreciation could lead to an increase in default risk.   14 
To motivate the exogeneity of the event, we need to examine the reasons behind 
France’s abandonment of bimetallism. Flandreau’s argument is that France’s action depended 
upon a strategic interaction between itself and Germany and not on any other considerations.
13 
For this very reason, the suspension of free-silver coinage becomes a key exogenous shock to 
the exchange rate for all silver based countries. For silver countries, there is evidence of 
transmission from the gold-silver market to their currencies’ nominal value. In Figures 2 
through 4, we plot several silver-currency exchange rates along with the silver-gold exchange 
rate (units of silver per unit of gold) between the 1870s and 1880s. The figures show that 
there is almost a one-to-one relationship between the exchange rates of silver countries and 
the silver-gold exchange rate. The question then is would there be any differential impact on 
silver countries? Could this exogenously imposed depreciation simply increase the debt 
burden faster than the revenue stream could expand for the silver group? Interest and 
amortization costs of debt payable in gold-backed sterling should have increased one-for-one 
with this depreciation. But a depreciation might have been beneficial by eventually 
stimulating an export boom or increasing the revenue capacity of a country.
14 
                                                            
13 The argument is that France was a large player in bullion markets due to its large reserves. It alone 
could stabilize the gold silver price. Its regime choice as of 1876 was not a function of expectations 
about the regime choice of the small peripheral silver countries we use in our sample. If it were, this 
could pollute the exogeneity of the test. Many in France, including the Bank of France itself, advocated 
the status quo maintaining that bimetallism was viable even in the face others’ adoption of gold. The 
political economy of France’s decision was quite controversial, and should best be seen as a 
distributional fight where those interested in boosting trade with Britain won out. This, however, was 
not an inevitable outcome. 
14 Silver briefly appreciated against gold for a period after France suspended the coinage of silver. The 
Economist (see 1876 and 1877) attributed this short-lived appreciation to a lower than expected supply 
of silver that Germany planned to sell on the world market.  15 
For completeness consider gold countries. If the suspension of silver coinage in 
France was interpreted as a shock to silver’s value, then this could have meant an appreciation 
vis-à-vis periphery countries. It could also have generated information that inflation and 
nominal interest rates would eventually come down in gold countries. For paper countries this 
would not necessarily have brought new information about currency values. In any case, the 
effect of the suspension of silver coinage on the yield spreads of gold and paper countries is 
an empirical question.  
 
 
Section V. Empirical Analysis 
V.A. Difference-in-Differences: Non-Silver-Using Countries as a Control Group 
 
We are interested in testing whether there was a significantly different change in 
sovereign bond spreads for silver countries as compared to similar non-silver countries due to 
the increase in the currency mismatch from the French suspension of silver coinage.
15 Assume 
that a country’s risk premium is a function of a debt sustainability measure and other controls. 
An event study model for any country i in a given week t can be written as: 
 
it t Git i it it hI gI cZ bD a r ε + + + + + = ,    (1) 
 
where r is the difference between the long-term bond yield of a domestic asset payable in 
foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate and the risk-free rate of return, D is a debt 
sustainability measure proxied by the ratio of hard currency debt to exports or debt to 
revenue.
16  We use exports and public revenues as our proxies for a country’s “asset” 
                                                            
15 We use the British consol yield as the reference yield. 
16 Most core and emerging market countries quoted commodity prices in local currency during the gold 
standard period. The London market would then adjust its sterling price based on the interaction of 
supply and demand in the world market. Nugent (1973) provides some empirical evidence on this 
question by examining the economic effects of silver depreciation during the gold standard. He shows  16 
position. These were indicators widely used by investors at the time to assess the solvency of 
sovereign borrowers (Flandreau and Zúmer, 2004).  Z is a vector of other factors specific to a 
country,  Gt I  is a control for if the country is in group G at time t which allows for factors 
affecting all countries in the same group,  t I is a period indicator which controls for market 
forces affecting all countries in the post-event window, and ε  is a country-week specific 
error term that us assumed to be uncorrelated with other included variables.  
Next, assume the hard currency debt to export ratio does not change over the period 
of observation due to new issues on capital markets but that changes in the ratio do occur 
because of week to week changes in the nominal exchange rate. This makes the ratio depend 
on the exchange rate realization of week t as follows:  
 
t
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where the superscript * denotes a variable measured in terms of the foreign numeraire, et is 
the realization of the nominal exchange rate (foreign currency units per unit of domestic 
currency) for a given week t, exports are measured in local currency and both debt and 
exports receive a 0 subscript to denote they are fixed during the sample.
17 An alternative 
model we use includes a debt to revenue ratio instead of the debt to export ratio which write 
as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that the depreciation of silver in the late nineteenth century initiated a large export boom in countries 
with a silver monetary standard. 
17 Two remarks are necessary. We assume exports are fixed in local currency units several months in 
advance so that the bulk of the value of exports is constant around any given date. If exports were not 
fixed, the ultimate impact on the spread would depend on two things: directly on the rise in the debt 
burden and negatively on the responsiveness of exports. The latter depends on pass through and the 
demand elasticity. Technically, the marginal impact on spreads would be the difference between the 
depreciation and the product of the elasticity of exports with respect to the exchange rate and the level 
of debt. If the expected boost to exports factors into expectations then the regression coefficient  ∆ b  
would identify the impact on spreads for a medium/long term adjustment in the sustainability ratio. If 
exports were a function of the exchange rate, this factor would enter multiplicatively in equation (4) in 
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Now substitute (2) into (1) and take first differences to arrive at  
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where  ∆ is the size of the depreciation in the nominal exchange rate between t and t-1 
relative to the realization in week t. Equation (4) suggests that changes in the bond spread 
between periods when the debt to export ratio is fixed is a function of the product of the 
change in the nominal exchange rate and the hard currency to debt ratio. It is also a function 
of perceptions and shocks affecting the country if it is in group G, and also shocks that affect 
the entire market. Note that under a fixed exchange rate system, and assuming group G (if 
country i is in it) has no differential systematic trend in factors affecting its spread, equation 
(4) would equal zero (plus any time trend) in expectation since there is no expected change in 
the nominal exchange rate. For countries on a fiat money system, we assume that the 
exchange rate follows a simple random walk so that the difference is also zero in expectation. 
However for countries following a silver standard the nominal exchange rate would move in 
parallel upwards with the known or expected rate of decline of the value of silver which we 
analyzed above. Equation (4) shows that the increase in spreads could occur because of the 
rise in the hard currency debt to export ratio due to the depreciation.  This illustrates one way 
in which a currency mismatch can lead to a perception of increased sovereign risk when the 
exchange rate depreciates.  
In general exchange rate movements could be endogenous to anticipated changes in 
the bond spread, so we will not implement a regression model simply based on equation (4) 
that includes the nominal exchange rate itself. Instead, we want to compare the change in the 
(4)  18 
average spread of silver countries (which we have argued undergo an exogenous depreciation 
in early 1876) to the change in our “control” group of non-silver countries at similar levels of 
indebtedness. Moreover we want to do this over a short time period so that we are sure that 
non-silver countries exchange rates will be unlikely to move for systematic reasons. 
To do this comparison, we employ a simple two period difference in differences 
(DID) regression based test. The baseline comparison period encompasses the 21 weeks 
between September 4
th, 1875 and January 29
th, 1876. The second period is the 27 weeks from 
January 29
th, 1876 until July 29, 1876. Using a second period indicator variable, equation (4) 
admits the following estimating equation: 
 
() ( ) ( ) it i t i t i i t i t it I D I D Silver I Silver I Spread ε µ α β β + + + + ∗ + ∗ = * * 2 1    (5) 
 
where Spread is the bond yield for country i in week t minus the “risk-free” British consol 
yield, Silver is an indicator if a country is on silver, I is an indicator variable equal to one in 
the weeks including and following the event of interest and D  is the level of hard currency 
debt relative to exports for 1875. Note because we implement the regression equation (5) over 
a number of weeks when the debt to export ratio and the exchange rate regime did not change 
we do not put a time subscript on these controls. Also we have i µ as a country-specific error 
term with mean zero and finite variance, and ε  is an error process that may be 
heteroscedastic and serially correlated. Since the before and after approach is econometrically 
equivalent to first differencing the data, the point estimates are not altered whatsoever 
whether our composite error term includes a country fixed effect or a country random effect. 
The key control variables, the silver dummy and the ratio of hard currency debt to 
exports are assumed to be uncorrelated with the composite error process (and unobserved and 
excluded variables collected therein) for all i and t.
18 Since we are effectively first 
                                                            
18 In our regressions we use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and we cluster these at the country 
level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation of the error process within countries. Bertrand, Duflo and  19 
differencing the data, correlation between these variables and other fixed but excluded 
characteristics is not a concern for consistent estimation of the key parameters. Moreover, 
since we are looking at the average change in yield spreads over a short period of time, we 
omit other macro-aggregate controls since they will be fairly constant (as should expectations 
about their evolution except for idiosyncratic shocks) during the pre-event and post-event 
window. In sum, the regression in equation (5) allows us to abstract from “fixed” effects that 
could be driving the levels of spread.  
Using equation (5) there are several quantities of interest. The partial derivative of 
equation (5) with respect to the post-event period and the silver control will give the impact 
for various values of the hard currency debt to export ratio. This is the value  1 β  +  i D 2 β . We 
can also measure the marginal effect of an increase in the ratio of hard currency debt to 
exports for silver countries on the yield spread. This value is given by  α β + 2 . Finally we 
can identify b, the sensitivity of the spread to an increase in the hard currency debt to export 
ratio. Since we know that the percentage depreciation affecting all silver countries is the same 
and equal to roughly 15 percent, we have b = 2 β /0.15.  
V. B. The Data 
 
For the sample employed in the empirical analysis, the average spread is 465 basis 
points (standard deviation = 613) and the median spread is 253 basis points.
19 The mean 
spread is 328 basis points for countries not on the silver standard in our sample prior to 
January 29, 1876 (median = 208). For this same period, the mean spread is 802 basis points 
for countries on the silver standard (median = 269). After January 29, 1876, the mean spread 
for non-silver countries drops to 304 basis points (median = 208) while in silver countries the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Mullainathan (2004) suggest clustering to decrease bias in the standard errors arising from such 
correlation in the error terms. 
19 There are 26 countries or territories in our baseline regression samples: Argentina, Austria, Australia 
(South Australia), Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Italy, 
Japan, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, Uruguay, United States. Prussia is included in specifications that use revenues but not included 
when we use exports because we have been unable to locate such data. We exclude defaulters from the 
time of default since calculating the yield is problematic when the bond’s duration is unknown.  20 
average spread rises to 825 basis points (median = 272).
20 Although the summary statistics do 
not control for the influence of other factors, silver countries appear to have had an increase 
compared to non-silver countries in their average spread after the heightened anticipation of 
the suspension of silver coinage by France. It might seem alarming that there is a gap in the 
mean spreads between groups. There is little reason to believe this will be a problem for 
identification of our key parameter. First, the medians are almost identical. Also, in the 
econometrics we first difference the data so as to remove any time-invariant heterogeneity in 
levels.  
Figures 5 through 8 present time series plots of the natural logarithm of the bond 
spread and the natural logarithm of the silver-gold exchange rate (a rise is a depreciation of 
silver against gold) for several silver-based countries including Ceylon, India, Mexico, and 
Russia.
21 The vertical line is the start date for the post-event window---January 29, 1876. Two 
things appear evident: (1) the bond spreads move very closely with the gold-silver exchange 
rate implying that depreciation raises the bond spreads and (2) the anticipated depreciation 
and suspension of silver coinage in France is associated with a sharp increase in bond spreads 
and also with a depreciation of close to ten percent between late January and July 1876.  
Figures 9a and 9b present the bond spreads for the group of countries which enter our 
regression samples. We include a vertical line at January 29, 1876 in the tradition of a typical 
“event study.” It is evident that for many silver countries, spreads rise significantly after 
January 1876. For non-silver countries, it appears much harder to make a similar case. 
 
V. C. Econometric Evidence 
 
We now attempt to formally test the hypothesis that currency mismatch mattered for 
silver countries. Our key control is a dummy variable when a country is on silver and an 
                                                            
20 Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2006) also find structural breaks in the yield spreads for several silver 
countries in 1876. However, they do not  offer an explanation for their empirical finding despite 
offering explanations for almost all other breaks they located. This is likely because they largely 
focused on country specific events. 
21 We discontinue the Russian spread in 1877 as it became a fiat currency country in that year.  21 
interaction variable between silver and the ratio of hard currency government debt 
outstanding relative to exports measured in 1876. As noted above, this ratio should be directly 
related to the capacity to service debts, which over this short interval of time should be 
affected by changes and expected changes in the exchange rate. We discuss the construction 
and source of these variables in more depth in the Data Appendix. Since our estimation 
sample covers only several months around the event of interest, it should not be a problem 
that we assume the key control variables are fixed over this period.  
Column 1 of Table 1 presents the baseline specification of the difference in 
differences model. The specification includes a dummy equal to one for the 21 weeks 
beginning January 29, 1876. High levels of hard currency debt relative to exports are 
associated with higher increases in silver countries’ spreads relative to the change in the non-
silver control group. Evaluated at the mean, the increase (in basis points) in the spread for 
silver countries after late January 1876 versus other non-silver countries would have been 30 
basis points (100*{-0.58  + 0.66*1.34}).
22 This accounts for 30 out of the 47 basis point rise 
(or 64 percent) in the spread for silver countries versus non-silver countries in the post-event 
period. Also, if we take the partial derivative of the yield spread with respect to the ratio of 
hard currency debt to exports and the post-event indicator, we see that yield spreads for silver 
countries are higher on average by 61 (0.66 - 0.06) basis points. The effect is statistically 
significant at the five  percent level. As predicted by the theoretical literature, a currency 
mismatch makes spreads sensitive to exchange rate depreciation. 
We can also recover the structural parameter b, the sensitivity of spreads to the hard 
currency debt to exports ratio. Our results in column 1 imply b is equal to roughly 4.4 
(0.66/.15) assuming the depreciation between autumn 1875 and July 1876 was on the order of 
15 percent. This coefficient also means that a country could expect spreads to increase by 
over 200 basis points with a doubling of its debt/export ratio from 0.5 to 1. 
                                                            
22 The silver countries in the regression of column 1 are Austria, Ceylon, Chile, India, Mauritius, Peru, 
Russia, and Spain. Spain was de jure bimetallic, but by maintaining a mint ratio lower than the market 
ratio, it exposed itself to a silver influx, a subsequent de facto silver regime and depreciation. Chile 
shares a similar story.  22 
Figure 10 illustrates the marginal impact on spreads for silver countries as a function 
of the hard currency debt to export ratio.
23 For very small ratios, where the stock of 
outstanding debt is less than annual exports, there does not appear to be a statistically 
significant impact. Figures 11a and 11b illustrate our finding in the form of scatter plots. The 
dependent variable here is the change in the average spread between the two periods and the 
explanatory variable is the hard currency debt to exports ratio. Robust standard errors are 
used. We leave out outliers like Spain and Argentina as well as Egypt, Turkey and Uruguay 
which default in the post-event window. The silver countries have a large positive slope of 
0.48 with a standard error of 0.25, t-statistic of 1.91 and a p-value of 0.13. The slope for non-
silver countries is positive (0.01) but small and very imprecisely estimated (standard error = 
0.02, t-statistic = 0.5, and p-value = 0.62). 
Outliers may be affecting our results since Spain (silver) and Argentina (non-silver) 
have large rises in their spreads. This turns out not to be the case. The regressions dropping 
the outliers provide the same qualitative finding as the baselines result. Also a median 
quantile regression reports a (statistically significant) coefficient and a standard error in 
parentheses on the interaction of mismatch, silver and the post-event dummy of 2.17 (0.7) and 
the post-event indicator and silver indicator of 0.48 (0.16). The empirical results are also 
robust for the marginal effect of the ratio of hard currency debt to exports on yield spreads. 
The interaction of the post-event dummy and the hard currency debt export ratio is 0.31 
(0.03). Moreover, in column 7 of Table 1, we leave out the obvious outliers in terms of 
changes in spreads (Argentina and Spain) from the baseline regression of column 1 Table 1. 
This leads to a coefficient on the interaction of mismatch, silver, and the post-event dummy of 
0.53 (0.22) and the post-event indicator and silver indicator of -0.5 (0.43). The impact 
becomes positive and statistically different from zero at levels of hard currency debt to 
exports of 0.95.  
                                                            
23 The marginal coefficient is the partial derivative of the spread with respect first to the post-event 
window and then with respect to silver. Figure 10 shows the partial derivative of the spread evaluated 
at the average values of the ratio of hard currency debt to exports for the countries in our sample. The 
95 percent confidence bands are estimated with a bootstrap simulation in Stata made available by 
William Clark at http://homepages.nyu.edu/%7emrg217/interaction.html.  23 
Table 2 presents two other specifications. In both columns we separate the 
components of the debt sustainability ratios and use them as separate regressors (in millions 
of current pounds). Column 1 reveals that the net effect of the depreciation for silver countries 
was to raise spreads. Interestingly, the level of hard currency debt has a positive coefficient 
while the coefficient on the interaction of exports, post-event dummy and the silver indicator 
is negative. Both coefficients are highly statistically significant. This result is consistent with 
the possibility that in the short-run the currency mismatch increased debt burdens as the value 
of debt relative to exports grew more quickly. In column 2 we see that revenues (interacted 
with the post-event dummy and silver) have a negative coefficient but this is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.28).  
Overall, we infer that the depreciation made debt payable in foreign currency more 
onerous. This was associated with a jump in the average silver country’s spread relative to the 
average non-silver country. On the other hand, a higher export capacity for a given stock of 
outstanding debt in that same silver country could have helped offset the relative jump. It 
appears that markets perceived that currency mismatches would enhance the risk of an asset 
in the midst of a depreciation. We also emphasize that this is evidence that currency mismatch 
matters: a significant increase in the ratio of hard currency debt to exports, in conjunction 
with a depreciation, could increase perceived default risk, lower investment, and possibly 
trigger a financial crisis for an emerging market economy.  
 
V.D. Sensitivity Analysis and Supplementary Findings 
 
Columns 2 through 8 of Table 1 test the robustness of the baseline specification. The 
second column increases the length of the pre- and post-event windows, and slightly changes 
the event date. The pre-event window now covers the period from January 30, 1875  up to 
December 4, 1875. We end the pre-event window in early December when the Economiste 
Français first announced that government officials and politicians had renewed the debate 
about adopting the gold standard. The post-event window covers the subsequent nine month  24 
period up to August 12, 1876. In this specification, the results are almost identical to those in 
column 1 although the statistical significance of the key variables is somewhat higher. The 
point estimate on the interaction of the post-event dummy, hard currency debt to exports and 
the silver dummy comes in at 0.75 in this sample. 
   In column 3, we also employ longer event windows and include the “world” 
unweighted average bond spread (excluding defaulters) pre-multiplied by country-specific 
coefficients –in the spirit of the CAPM-- to capture general market movements. Since the 
results are almost the same as those from column 2, we cannot seem to attribute the rise in 
spreads for hard currency debtors on the silver standard to the interaction of their future 
prospects and changing market conditions. 
Column 4 uses the average spread in the shorter pre-event window and the average 
spread in the post-event window as the dependent variable. Duflo et. al (2002) show that this 
is one way to deal with spurious inference arising from serial correlation. This method creates 
two observations per country (but only one for Egypt, Peru, Uruguay and Turkey because 
these countries defaulted in the post-event window).  The point estimates and the marginal 
effects are only slightly changed. Columns 5 and 6 replace the hard currency debt to export 
ratio with the hard currency debt to revenue ratio. Since revenues probably depend indirectly 
on exports, we are not surprised to see that the qualitative inference that a high ratio of hard 
currency debt to revenue for silver countries is associated with higher increases in the spread. 
Table 3 reports some other robustness checks. In column 1 we take on the idea that 
the total debt (i.e., debt payable in domestic currency or with no fixed exchange rate plus gold 
clause/hard currency debt) to export ratio matters. This addresses the concern that the results 
from Table 1 are found simply because the hard currency to export ratio is highly correlated 
(ρ = 0.88) with this more conventional sustainability measure. We do indeed find evidence 
that silver countries with higher total debt to export ratios faced higher spreads in early 1876. 
However, several reasons suggest that the depreciation itself and its impact on the real 
repayment value of outstanding hard currency debt drives this result. First note that the debt 
to export ratio includes both hard and local currency debt in the numerator. Moreover, to the  25 
extent that the burden of local currency debt should be unaffected in the short run by 
exchange rate changes, we would expect the coefficient to be smaller in this case as some 
countries with higher proportions of local currency debt are included in the treatment group. 
Theoretically they should see much smaller impacts on their spreads, and they do.  
In column 2, we test the hypothesis that all countries with high hard currency debt to 
export ratios saw an increased spread after January 1876. This is one test of the imposed 
assumption that silver countries were differentially impacted by news of silver suspension. 
The coefficient on the interaction term (post event dummy x [hard currency debt/exports]) 
here is very small (0.06) and is not statistically significant at the five or ten percent level of 
significance. When all countries are considered in one treatment group, there is no discernible 
effect of the French policy change. Column 3 performs a similar exercise but uses the total 
debt to revenue ratio as the key control. We observe a similar result; there is no impact on the 
spread in the wake of silver coinage suspension by France.  
We also address the possibility that our treatment group might be different on a 
number of crucial dimensions besides the exchange rate regime from the control group. This 
could lead to spurious inference in Table 1. One possible explanation for our results is that the 
silver countries in our sample were less developed and had weak institutions that gave rise to 
poor fiscal outcomes. However, this is unlikely since there are several countries in the control 
group that possessed these characteristics. There are also several countries on the silver 
standard that were advanced relative to some of the emerging market countries in the control 
group. (e.g., Spain, Chile and India). In column 4 of Table 3, we substitute a “periphery” 
dummy for the silver dummy.
24 Here we find that there is no additional impact of the hard 
currency debt to export ratio on spreads in the periphery in the post-event window. We ran 
simulations to produce confidence bands (as above) for the joint coefficient (the post event 
                                                            
24 The periphery includes Argentina, Austria (silver), Brazil, Ceylon (silver), Chile (silver), Colombia, 
Egypt, India (silver), Italy, Japan, Mauritius (silver), Portugal, Russia (silver), South Africa (Cape of 
Good Hope), Spain (silver), Turkey, and Uruguay. Norway and Switzerland did not have bonds that 
actively traded on the London market during this period. This leaves Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Prussia, Sweden and the US as core countries in the 
control group. The countries in our “core” grouping could also be described as high-income countries.  26 
dummy and the periphery coefficient and that same combination interacted with the debt 
ratio). We found this is not statistically significant at the 95 percent level over the relevant 
range of the data. The currency mismatch problem is absent in the periphery, and it does not 
seem convincing to argue silver is simply a proxy for the periphery.  
Finally we assessed the validity of our event date by implementing a series of placebo 
experiments. The idea here was to see if at other break points spreads would display similar 
behavior perhaps because of pre-existing trends. We changed the breakpoint date sequentially 
throughout 1875 and then arrived at an empirical distribution of the marginal effect. We used 
this to conduct a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the effect found using the “true” 
break point is zero at the 95 percent level of confidence.
25 If our estimate of the marginal 
impact of the hard currency debt ratio for silver countries post-event from column 1 Table 1 is 
greater than the value in the 97.5th percentile or smaller than the 2.5
th percentile we can reject 
the null hypothesis. 
We conducted these 48 placebo experiments corresponding to a “false” break point in 
each of the weeks prior to December 12, 1875. We then interacted these pseudo-event dates 
with the given hard currency debt ratios and the regimes from 1875 and re-ran the 
specification from column 1 of Table 1. We then found the relevant percentiles in the 
empirical distribution of the marginal effect to test to see if we find a similar pattern. 
Evaluated at the means, the placebo impact in the 97.5
th percentile was only 7 basis points 
while in the actual sample the point estimate of the marginal effect was 30 basis points. This 
is even more evidence that the moment in time we isolate as giving rise to expectations of 
silver depreciation had a substantive impact because of its effects on the expected evolution 
of the gold price of silver.
26 
 
VI. Discussion and the Growth Impact of Currency Risk 
                                                            
25 The assumption is that there will be no systematic impact on spreads in a series of draws on dates 
when there is little information entering into asset markets about silver’s value. 
26 To test the sensitivity to the assumed break point, we also eliminated the last month of the pre-event 
window and the first month of the post-event window. Results are nearly identical to those in column 1 
of Table 1.  27 
 
  Our results seem to have shown that silver countries experienced a differential rise in 
spreads from the moment that continued sizeable depreciation became more likely. There is a 
question of whether the impact we have found is a long-term impact or short-run impact. It is 
almost surely a short to medium term impact at most. Risk premia are partially determined by 
predictions about the future course of policies and events. All else equal, markets must have 
expected a medium term improvement in the balance sheet of silver countries. As exports 
expanded, the ability to service debt and revenue bases would have surely expanded. This 
could occur either with the expansion of national income or as revenue tariffs increased in 
step with imports. A stronger export position also could have increased the availability of 
hard currency that could help pay for previous debts incurred. Many silver countries also 
managed to adopt the gold standard around the first decade of the twentieth century. 
Nevertheless many countries persistently ran loose monetary policies or clung to silver for a 
number of years. This could have led to a persistent increase in the risk premium such as that 
we have identified. 
  The natural question is whether the impact we have found is economically 
substantive. We have seen that a one time unexpected nominal depreciation led to a roughly 
30 basis points increase in borrowing spreads. Such an increase, if translated into the cost of 
capital, could have generated a substantial gap in income per capita because of slower capital 
accumulation. Assume that a default premium of 30 basis points was equivalent to a 10 
percent increase from a baseline yield of three percent (slightly lower than the median silver 
yield so as to bias our results down to a lower bound) and that it persisted. A simple 
neoclassical growth model suggests it could have led to a long-run gap in output per capita 
between the average silver country and the average non-silver country of between two to four 
percent. To see this, assume the equation governing the rate of growth of the capital stock in a 
standard Solow growth model depends inversely on the rental price of capital relative to the 
price of output so that  28 





Y and K are the levels of output and the accumulated capital stock, δ is the rate of depreciation 
(assumed to be four percent), s is the savings rate (assumed to be 17.5 percent) and r is the 
rental price of capital relative to the price of output. Assume also a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function for output 
α α − =
1 L AK Y where L is the labor force and α is 0.3. Also 
assume that A, the effectiveness of labor or multi-factor productivity grows at one percent per 
year. 
The assumed impact of the change in the borrowing costs is to raise r by ten percent 
relative to its pre-event value and thus to slow the accumulation of capital.
27 Hence we 
assume an initial rental price of one and increase it by ten percent so as to lower the effective 
saving rate to 15.9 percent. This shock leads to a gap in income per worker relative to what it 
would have been of two percent after 15 years and four percent in the long run.  There is of 
course no long-run impact on growth rates of output per worker. But in the first year, the 
model suggests the growth rate of output per worker would be 20 percent lower than 
otherwise and ten percent lower ten years after the shock. Simple averages taken from 
aggregate data suggest that income per capita in all gold standard countries grew at 1.5 
percent per year while non-gold countries grew at one percent per year between 1880 and 
1913. While these comparison groups only roughly overlap with our silver and non-silver 




                                                            
27 30 basis points is more than 10 percent at the median and much less than that for the mean. We are 
interested in a broader extrapolation/policy lesson and so are thinking in terms of the effect of a 
surprise depreciation for any country regardless of its regime. For most countries at the time spreads on 
average are in the range of 200 to 300 basis points. 
28 Over 70 percent of the observations in the control group are gold-based. Also, a micro-founded 
Ramsey growth model based on the specification found in Jeanne and Gourinchas (forthcoming) 
provides a slightly different result. We assume a persistent risk premium after the shock equivalent to 
an increase in the baseline rate of depreciation (0.06) of 0.003. This leads to a permanently lower 
capital stock per effective worker which would lower output per effective worker in the steady state by 
a little over one percent.  29 
 
This paper examines the impact of currency mismatch. The question is: does a real 
exchange rate depreciation increase default risk by reducing the perceived ability of a country 
to repay foreign currency debts denominated in a foreign currency? Or does a real exchange 
rate depreciation reduce default risk by stimulating an export boom that improves a country’s 
asset position? Under normal circumstances, this is a very difficult question to address given 
the endogenous properties of the exchange rate. However, history offers some insight into this 
question. France’s decision to permanently abandon a bimetallic standard and adopt the gold 
standard in the 1870s led to a large decrease in the demand for silver as the country fully 
suspended its substantial purchases of the precious metal. In anticipation of the demise of 
bimetallism, the world gold price of silver fell by an historically unprecedented ten to fifteen 
percent in the first half of 1876. While the decision to abandon a bimetallic standard and 
adopt gold may have been endogenous for France, it was an exogenous decision from the 
viewpoint of countries and policymakers on the periphery.  
The exogenous nature of the French suspension of silver coinage allows us to identify 
the impact of an exchange rate depreciation on default risk using a standard before and after 
analysis. We introduce a new methodology, a difference-in-differences approach, to identify 
the effect of the exogenous exchange rate depreciation on sovereign country risk. The 
empirical methodology could also be applied to other events in international finance where 
there is an identifiable exogenous shock that differentially affects countries in the global 
economy. Our particular episode has the added advantage that many macroeconomic 
variables were probably quite stable during the event study given that the estimation period 
only covers a few months.  
We find that the impact of France’s policy change worked by increasing hard 
currency debt exposure. In our sample, the anticipation of the suspension of free silver 
coinage by France seems to have increased the debt burden of the average silver country 
through exchange rate depreciation. Nevertheless, in the medium to long-run, the depreciation 
of silver in world markets helped spur an export boom for silver standard countries in the  30 
periphery, improving somewhat their ability to repay the foreign debts denominated in foreign 
currency. The impact of the boom also depended on a country’s export capacity relative to 
debt repayments. The increase in real debt repayments and default risk would have been 
greatest for the most isolated and inwardly oriented silver economies.  
We have examined an important public policy question by looking at the relationship 
between default risk and exchange rate depreciation from one of the most important 
disruptions to the international monetary system in the last 150 years. We find that openness 
to international trade is one possible way to limit the negative impact of depreciation in a 
world of currency mismatch. Our results suggest that if LDCs are going to embrace 
international capital flows tainted by hard currency contractual terms, then they should also 
do so in proportion to their export potential. 
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Data Appendix 




We collected all available weekly bond yields for all countries reported in The Economist for the period 
1870-1879.  For countries with multiple issues, we selected the largest issue with the longest 
maturity that was most frequently quoted in The Economist. In the following table, we list the 
interest rate stated in the terms of the bond as well as the due date (if known).  Years refer to 
the issue of the Statesman’s Yearbook from which the data came. 
 
Argentina – 6 percent public works, redeemable by 1892. 
Austria – 5 percent silver rentes, perpetuity bonds. 
Australia – South Australia, 6 percent, due 1891-1900. 
Bolivia – 6 percent, due 1898.  
Brazil – 5 percent, 1865, redeemable by 1902. 
Canada – 4 percent, due 1904-08.  
Ceylon – 6 percent, due 1878. 
Chile – 5 percent, 1870, redeemable by 1902. 
Colombia – 4.75 percent, 1873, due 1885. 
Costa Rica – 6 percent, 1871, repayable by 1894. 
Ecuador – 1 percent, New Consolidated,   
Egypt – 7 percent, 1864, due 1879.  
France – 3 percent rentes, perpetuity bonds.  
Greece – 5 percent, 1824-25 (in default). 
Honduras – 10 percent, due 1884. 
Hungary – 5 percent, 1871, redeemable by 1902. 
India – 4 percent, due 1888. 
Italy – 5 percent, ex 25f, rentes, perpetuity bonds. 
Japan – 9 percent, due 1882. 
Mauritius – 6 percent, due 1878. 
Mexico – 3 percent, (in default).  
New Zealand – 5 percent consolidated, due 1905. 
Paraguay – 8 percent, 1871, due 1893. 
Peru – 5 percent, 1872, due 1898. 
Portugal – 3 percent, perpetuity bonds.  
Russia – 5 percent, 1822, perpetuity bonds  
South Africa – Cape of Good Hope, 4.5 percent, due 1913-1916. 
Santo Domingo – 6 percent 1869, due 1894. 
Spain – 3 percent, perpetuity bonds. 
Sweden – 5 percent, issued in 1868.  
Turkey – 6 percent, 1871, due 1907. 
Uruguay – 6 percent, 1871, due 1893. 
United Kingdom – 3 percent consol, perpetuity bonds. 
United States - 5 percent, 10/40, due 1904.  
Venezuela – 3 percent 
We also collected weekly bond price data for four countries from the Amsterdamsch Effectenblad  
whose debt most actively traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. In the following table, we list the 
interest rate stated in the terms of the bond as well as the due date (if known).   
Belgium – 2.5 percent, perpetuity bonds. 
Denmark -- 4 percent . 
Germany(Prussia) – 3.5 percent consols, perpetuity bonds. 
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Exports, Hard Currency Debt, Local Currency Debt, and Revenue,  
 
Most of this data comes from the Investor’s Monthly Manual (IMM) and various issues of the 
Statesman’s yearbook (SYB). In certain cases we had to rely on specific country sources for 




Argentina (SYB 1878)  
Austria (SYB 1880) 
Belgium (SYB)  





Costa Rica (IMM) 
Denmark (SYB) 
Ecuador (SYB) Exports are to Great Britain only. 
Egypt (IMM) 
France (British Board of Trade Statistics) 
Greece (SYB) 










Santo Domingo (IMM) 
Spain (British Board of Trade) 
Sweden (IMM) 
Turkey (SYB) 
Uruguay (SYB 1878 number is for 1875) 




Hard Currency Debt/ Total Debt:  
 
Argentina (SYB 1878)  
Austria: Moline (1875) We classify debt payable in silver (argent) as hard currency debt. Numbers are 
for 1873. 
Bolivia (SYB 1878) Numbers are for external debt. 
Belgium (SYB) 
Brazil (Levy, 1995)   
Ceylon (SYB 1878) 
Chile (Molina, 1898) 
Colombia (SYB 1878) 
Costa Rica (IMM) 
Denmark (SYB numbers for external debt are used as hard currency debt) 
Ecuador (SYB 1878) Numbers for external debt and internal debt since the internal currency is not in 
circulation and rarely used.  
Egypt (IMM)  
France (IMM) 
Greece (SYB) 
Honduras (SYB 1878)  33 
India (SYB 1878) 
Italy (Zamagni, 1998, 1999) 
Japan (Toukei, 1908 given to us by personal correspondence by Masato Shizume) 





Russia (Anuaire des Finances Russes, 1876)  
Santo Domingo (IMM) 




United States (SYB) 





Argentina (IMM)  
Austria (SYB 1878) 
Belgium (SYB) 
Bolivia (SYB 1878) Numbers are for 1873-74 




Costa Rica (SYB,1878)  
Denmark (SYB) 
Ecuador (SYB 1878) 
Egypt (IMM) France (IMM) 
Greece (SYB 1877) 
Honduras (SYB 1878) 
India (IMM) 












Uruguay (SYB 1878 number is an estimate for 1875)  
United States (SYB) 
Venezuela (SYB) 
 
Periphery Indicator: We use the countries defined as being in the periphery in Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2003). These include Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Bolivia Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, India, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Santo Domingo, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. However, we exclude Denmark from the periphery and place it in the core as 
Sweden is in the core too.  
 
Silver Regime Indicator: Data is based on Meissner (2005) and is available upon request from the 
authors.  34 
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Notes: The vertical line is 31 January, 1876 which coincides with the expectation of  further depreciations and the 
French suspension of silver coinage. Sterling exchange rates are derived from underlying data on local 
units per US dollar which were converted using market weekly dollar-pound exchange rates. Sources: 
























































Notes: Original figures were in pence per ounce in London from Gallarotti (1995), and were converted to the silver-gold 
exchange rate using Laughlin's (1886) conversion factor p. 225. Figures are annual averages.
France Suspends Silver Coinage, 1876 















































































































































Notes: See notes to previous figure 
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Notes: Bond spread is calculated against the British Consol. Vertical line is 29 January, 1876. 
Sources: Global Financial Data and The Economist. 
 

























Notes: Bond spread is calculated against the British Consol. Vertical line is 29 January, 1876. 
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Notes: See notes to previous figure. 
 





















































































































































































































































Notes: Vertical lines represent break point for the regressions.  
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Appendix of News Articles 
 
News Articles from The Economist on the French Suspension of Free-Silver Coinage and the 
Depreciation of Silver 
July 1, 1875 – August 12, 1876 
 
Dates Article  Summary 
July 1, 1875 – January 28, 1876  No significant news articles 
January 29, 1876  Paris Chamber of Commerce asks the Minister of Commerce and 
Agriculture for the immediate adoption of the Gold Standard and 
proposes that France demonetize silver beginning January 31, 
1876 (p. 130)  
February 26, 1876  Research by M. Clement Juglar concludes that France should join 
the gold standard (p. 250).   
March 4, 1876  Members of the Latin Monetary Union discuss limiting the issue 
of silver coinage. Further reductions in silver coinage agreed upon 
by France, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. (p. 282) 
March 11, 1876  The meeting of the Paris Political Economy Society discusses the 
causes of the depreciation of silver. Increased production from 
mines in the United States, Germany monetary policy, and the 
French suspension of silver coinage are the 3 main reasons given 
for the fall in the price of the precious metal. M. Cernuschi states 
that the Bank of France refuses to grant loans on the security of 
silver deposits. The Economist thinks that this statement is 
premature. 
(pp. 314-15) 
March 18, 1876  The Economist discusses the effect of the return of specie 
convertibility in France on the market price of silver. The weekly 
financial paper predicts that the price of silver will rise if France 
retains a bimetallic system. While The Economist believes that 
France should adopt the gold standard, they are unsure whether 
this is the right time for the country to switch monetary standards. 
(pp. 337-39) 
March 18, 1876  Bank of France will continue to grant loans collateralized by silver 
bars and foreign silver coins, but with a reduction of 20 percent in 
the amount of per kilogram advanced. M. Cernuschi advocates 
suspension of silver coinage and believes that the issue of 
abandoning the precious metal will be brought before the French 
Senate in a short period of time. (p. 345) 
March 25, 1876  M. Rouland, Governor of the Bank of France, discusses the recent 
depreciation of silver. The Governor expressed his support of 
bimetallism which had served France well for centuries. (p. 376)  
March 25, 1876  The silver question discussed in the French Senate. 
M. Horace Say, the French Minister of Finance, presented a bill 
that would limit or suspend silver coinage. M. de Parieu discusses 
a couple of different methods by which silver could be 
demonetized. (p. 373) 
 
April 1, 1876  M. de Parieu introduces a bill to coin existing silver at the French 
mint but to suspend the coinage of additional silver. (p. 400)  
April 8, 1876  M. Michel-Chevalier supports France’s adoption of the gold 
standard. (p. 430) 
June 17, 1876  French Senate continues its debate over silver coinage. (p. 710-11) 
July 1, 1876  Bill to empower the government to restrict silver five-franc 
discussed by the French Senate again.  
(p. 770) 
July 8, 1876  The French Minister of Finance speaks to the French Senate on the 
silver question. The Economist notes that if France returns to the 
bimetallic standard, then the price of silver will rise. Otherwise, 
the price of silver will fall. (p. 794) 
July 15, 1876  The British government issues a report on the depreciation of 
silver. Attributes the causes of the depreciation to three factors: (1) 
German demonetization of silver, (2) actions by the Latin 
Monetary Union led by France, and (3) increase in the tribute that 
India pays England that has decreased the demand for silver (pp.  50 
821-24) 
August 5, 1876  Bill passed demonetizing silver. (pp. 919-920) 
August 12, 1876  Vice-President of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce 
attributes the fall in the price of silver to actions by France and the 
Latin Monetary Union (p. 949) 
August 12, 1876  The Minister of Finance orders that silver bars will not be received 
at the mints of Paris and Bordeaux for coinage. (p. 950)  
 
 
News Articles from L’Economiste Français on the French Suspension of Free-Silver Coinage and 
the Depreciation of Silver 
July 1, 1875 –December 31, 1876 
 
Dates Article  Summary 
July 1, 1875 –4 December, 1876  No significant news articles. 
December 11, 1875  Editorial on the January 1876 Latin Monetary Union (LMU) 
meeting. No one has any idea what the delegates will do 
in terms of continued silver coinage and movement 
towards abandoning bimetallism. (p. 737) 
December 18, 1875  Remarks on the recent fall of silver. The question of whether to 
discontinue silver coinage is of the utmost importance 
(plus de gravité que jamais). London is the most 
important silver market to watch. (p. 769) 
January 22, 1876  Lead article on the LMU meeting. The emphasis of the article is 
on the fact that the big questions of regime choice face 
the delegates to the LMU meeting. There is an alarmist 
message that silver’s depreciation is getting worse 
everyday. It is also reported that the Paris Chamber of 
Commerce has come out publicly in favor of the gold 
standard. A message from H. Cernuschi is reprinted 
saying that gold standard advocates and practitioners 
have caused the fall of silver. (p.97) 
January 22, 1876  Article on the Paris Chamber of Commerce vote endorsing gold. 
(p. 111) 
January 29, 1876  Cernuschi opines that demonetization of silver would lead to 
reducing economic ties between gold and silver blocs. (p. 
139) 
February 5, 1876  Observation that people are in the midst of watching silver fall, 
and that it has fallen nine percent off its historical par 
(15.5: 1). “In a few months time, and definitely by the 
end of the year, it (the depreciation) will be fifteen 
percent. (p. 173) 
February 5, 1876  Extract from the London Times Money Market section and the 
Mocatta and Goldsmid silver observer: “silver has 
suffered a considerable fall…it is hard to find buyers in 
the market…we don’t expect to see much new gold in the 
coming weeks…” (p. 173) 
February 5, 1876  Reports that the LMU has made a new motion but does not say 
what it was. The reader is referred to the Journal Officiel. 
February 12, 1876  Letter from Victor Bonnet that silver’s fall is not due to low 
demand. (p. 204) 
February 19, 1876  Reprint of a letter by Henri Fould dated February 17, 1876. 
“Silver’s fall is without limit if the large creditor 
countries continue to reject this metal; we are now talking 
about an eleven percent fall; tomorrow it will be a 20 
percent fall…If a joint decision to adhere to bimetallism 
cannot be reached, as is probable, the gold standard will 
be imposed on the LMU in order to protect its own 
interests. (p.235) 
March 4, 1876  A note on the connection between India and Great Britain and the 
value of the rupee. (p. 294) 
March 4, 1876  The article reprints the fundamental acts from the recent meeting 
of the LMU. Coinage quotas of silver are nearly the same 
as in the previous year. (p. 299) 
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March 4, 1876  The fall of silver continues to be a preoccupation of business 
men… the rupee depreciated by six percent in two 
months. (p. 305) 
March 11, 1876  Lead article: Silver’s fall is now more important than ever and 
even Great Britain is taking notice due to the effect on the 
rupee. The amount of silver coinage for 1877 is uncertain 
but there will be another meeting of the LMU in January 
of 1877. The current measures are incomplete and will 
only accelerate the fall of silver. Leading theories on the 
fall of silver are mentioned. Cernuschi believes it to be 
due to German monetary reform. The London Times 
believes it is due to this and an increased supply of silver 
on world markets. The London Economist argues for both 
of these reasons and also the continue fear of future 
depreciation—or panic. There is also a forecast for 500 
million francs of silver to be produced in 1876. (p. 321) 
March 3, 1876  There is a big debate at the Societé D’Economie on the merits of 
various monetary systems. (p. 328) 
March 11, 1876  Cernuschi fields a lengthy defense of bimetallism stating that 
demand for silver will raise its price. He claims that 
bimetallism in France, US, UK and Germany could 
maintain the value of silver relative to gold. (p. 330) 
March 25, 1876  Report on the introduction to the French Senate of the proposal to 
suspend the coinage of silver in France. In proceedings in 
the Senate, De Parieu holds that the gold standard is the 
only viable system. Leon Say (Minister of Finance) 
pledges to uphold the articles of the LMU. But Say also 
puts forward a motion to allow for the complete 
suspension of coinage of five franc coins. There is also a 
summary of an article from The London Economist 
March 18, 1876 stating that silver’s value would increase 
if France resumed bimetallism. (p. 395) 
April 1, 1876  Lead article on the debate in the French Senate on the proposal to 
suspend silver coinage. The editor believes that 
suspension (for which he is an advocate) will be 
approved and believes that others believe this too. “Do 
we have a reason to be upset? Not at all, despite the fact 
that the daily press seems to think we (advocates of 
bimetallism) have been beaten” Avon-nous quelques 
motifs d’être mécontent…? En aucune maniere, quoi que 
la presse quotidienne semble nous regarder comme 
vaincus.” The article goes on to argue that having a 
discussion on the topic is a small victory in itself. It is 
observed the government has not come out decisively for 
a bill, but that it does not view bimetallism has having too 
many merits. (p. 417) 
April 1, 1876  This article is a summary of the law proposed by the Minister of 
Finance, Leon Say, to suspend silver coinage. “We ask 
for the facility to limit or to suspend the coinage of five 
franc coins… by decree…” (p. 453) 
May 20, 1876  The article claims that London has been the biggest silver market 
for the preceding century and a half. It also remarks that 
silver’s depreciation is affecting the exchange rates of 
silver countries. (p. 656) 
June 3, 1876  There is a lengthy discussion of India’s budgetary problems. The 
depreciation is alleged to have led to losses of over 2.3 
million pounds sterling in 1875-1876 compared to just 
under .898 million in 1874-1875. (p. 721) 
June 17, 1876  The article notes that the Senate Commission in charge of the law 
to suspend silver coinage by decree has approved the law 
with the proviso that this facility would cease on 
December 31, 1878. It is noted that many amendments to 
make the move more definite have been put forward and 
that the Mr. Rouland representing the Bank of France was 
putting up stiff resistance to the bill because it believes  52 
silver’s price is going to rise. The article continues to 
discuss the fall of silver which to that date stood at 14 
percent below the old 15.5 par value. (p. 775) 
June 24, 1876  Some statistics that refute Mr. Rouland’s arguments are presented 
including summaries of historical total production of 
silver and silver coinage in France since 1850. (p. 820) 
July 15, 1876  The article claims that silver has now depreciated about 20 percent 
from par. There is a discussion of coinage of silver in 
Great Britain. The message is that this is important for 
those following the debate in the Senate on reform and 
that if France makes silver into a token coin, silver 
coinage will fall dramatically. (p. 71) 
July 15, 1876  The author notes that before discussion on the silver question 
began in earnest in the French Senate depreciation of 
silver was about ten percent. During the debates, silver 
had fallen fifteen percent and that this last month it has 
gone to about 20 percent even touching 24 or 25 percent. 
It is reported that the conseil superieur voted last month 
17 to 6 in favor of moving towards a gold standard (i.e., 
suspending silver coinage). A report by George Goschen 
on the causes of silver’s fall is also summarized. The 
principal cause now seems to be simply that supply is 
larger than demand. (p. 77) 
July 22, 1876  There is more discussion about the costs of the fall of silver. The 
report by Goschen on the fall of silver is analyzed. 
Number two on the list of reasons for why silver’s value 
has fallen recently is the LMU’s limitation on silver 
coinage. (p. 105) 
August 8, 1876  There is an analysis of the recent depreciation of silver and its 
effects on exchange rates in China. (p. 189) 
August 26, 1876  This is another long article on the depreciation of silver. It is 
devoted to the problems arising for India. The key 
variables that determine the effects of depreciation are the 
level of annual debt payments to Europe and the amount 
of exports. (p. 269) 
September 1876-December 1876  There are no important articles on silver’s depreciation. There is 
one article on December 12, 1876 discussing the 
possibility that silver’s appreciation since August could 
be due to a lower than expected output of silver from 
Nevada. (p.751)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 